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Fiscal Illusion and 
Fiscal Reality:
Do the Budget "Deficits" Have Clothes?
Laurence J. Kotlikoff
Boston University and
National Bureau of Economic Research
Fiscal policy has been a hot topic in recent years and 
remains so today. No wonder. Since 1981 the federal govern 
ment has made substantial cuts in personal income taxes, 
provided the largest investment incentives in the country's 
history, significantly altered the projected course of Social 
Security benefits, and run enormous official budget deficits. 
However, all this fiscal action has apparently just whetted the 
appetites of fiscal enthusiasts who are now proposing what 
has been billed as fundamental tax reform.
My focus in this talk is not to review recent fiscal history or 
presage current tax reform bills, but to discuss an issue that 
has bothered me repeatedly over the past few years. Put 
simply, my question is the following: in thinking about fiscal 
policy and particularly about government debt, have we been 
taken in by the accountants and have we, as a result, been 
missing the economic forest for the trees? I hope to convince 
you that the answer, if not yes, is at least maybe. My sniping 
at economic accounting is not to disparage the accounting 
profession; indeed my real gripe is not with accountants, but 
rather with economists who are so often misled by the labeling 
of economic variables and then compound the error by 
misleading others.
Before I turn to substantive points, let me say that I am not 
arguing for different or better accounting. In my view, ac-
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counting is properly chosen after, not before, one chooses 
one's economic model. The accounting constructs that are 
appropriate for one model may be totally inappropriate for 
another. For example, while one can conceive of a model in 
which the government's current definition of the deficit is 
meaningful, one can also write down other models in which 
the current definition has little or no relation to the govern 
ment's fundamental debt policy. Unfortunately, economists, 
when speaking publicly, typically fail to explicate their models 
and take the easy route of discussing the official numbers that 
are available and generally familiar, despite the fact that these 
numbers may be highly misleading indicators of the numbers 
actually suggested by their theories.
In this and other respects, we are tyrannized by our 
accounting. Somehow or other, official numbers invite con 
cern and comment, and, when research funding is available, 
official numbers also invite investigation. A prime example is 
the industry of international finance economists who investi 
gate changes in countries' balances of payment. Fortunately, 
we do not keep balance of payment accounts for each state in 
the U.S. or we would have an industry of economists studying 
the balance of payments crisis between Michigan and Tennes 
see and related nonsense.
Let me illustrate my concern about fiscal illusion by asking 
you to consider the Social Security taxes you pay to the 
government. Notice that the word "taxes" has been ascribed 
to the Social Security payments you and your employer send 
to the government. But why is the word "taxes" used? It's 
used because some accountant or economist arbitrarily chose 
that word back in 1936 or thereabouts. Suppose we label these 
payments to the government differently. Let's label them 
"loans" from you to the government. You may object to this 
nomenclature, but bear with it for the moment.
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Loans are typically repaid, so let's also label Social Security 
benefit payments "return of principal plus interest." Note that 
from your point of view the new terminology is not completely 
foreign. With the new language, you can now think of 
yourselves as lending money to the government (in the form of 
Social Security contributions) during your working years and 
receiving principal plus interest (in the form of Social Security 
benefit payments) during your retirement. Surely this se 
quence of payments and receipts is very similar to those 
associated with purchasing a government Treasury bond. 
When you purchase a Treasury bond or other security, you 
make payments to the government now in exchange for future 
receipts from the government. Hence, from your point of 
view, your payment of what is called Social Security "taxes" 
is, in most respects, equivalent to your purchase of a govern 
ment liability. While the mean return and risk properties of 
your invisible Social Security bonds differ from those of 
official government bonds, such differences in risk properties 
provide no basis for labeling one set of payments to the 
government "taxes" and the other set of payments "loans."
Let's now make the invisible Social Security bonds visible 
by supposing that the federal government, starting at the 
inception of the Social Security system, had also adopted the 
language of lending and borrowing to describe its flows of 
payments from and to the public sector and, indeed, had 
issued explicit Social Security bonds to the public in exchange 
for Social Security contributions. We are supposing then that 
Social Security system sends a piece of paper marked Social 
Security bond to each worker in exchange for his or her Social 
Security contribution.
Consider now the impact on the government's measure of 
official debt of switching from the "tax" and "transfer" 
language to the language of "lending" and "repayment." As 
you can read in the Appendix to chapter 4 of the 1982
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Economic Report of the President, this change in language, 
while involving no change in fundamentals, would have 
radically altered current and past reports of the federal debt 
and federal deficits. The government would have reported 
official deficits in the 1960s over $300 billion dollars for several 
years and deficits over $100 billion dollars for most years 
during the 1960s and 1970s. Since the price level and size of 
the economy was much smaller then than now, as a fraction of 
GNP these alternative deficit figures would swamp those of 
recent years. With this alternative labeling of Social Security 
receipts and payments 1985 official government debt would 
exceed its current $1.5 trillion value by a factor of roughly 5.
Presumably, such a redefinition of official government 
liabilities would raise the question of classifying other implicit 
commitments to future expenditures as government debt. If 
one is willing to label implicit promises to pay future retire 
ment benefits official liabilities, why not include implicit 
expenditure commitments to maintain the national parks, to 
defend the country, or to provide minimum sustenance to the 
poor?
A heated debate about the appropriate definition of gov 
ernment debt would likely lead some shrewd economist to 
suggest eliminating official government debt and deficits en 
tirely by just using some more of what is essentially innovative 
accounting. This economist would suggest that rather than 
raise additional funds by issuing government securities, the 
government should simply levy a head "tax" per adult 
promising to provide each adult in the following or some 
subsequent year a refundable tax credit equal to the "tax" plus 
interest on the "tax." If the adult died before repayment, the 
"tax" credit would be paid to his or her estate. Furthermore, 
those who are liquidity-constrained would be permitted to 
borrow against their future "tax" credits.
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The equality, in present value, between each household's 
head tax and its head tax credit leaves household budgets and, 
therefore, private behavior unaltered. However, since future 
tax credits, like future Social Security benefit payments, are 
not reported in the current federal budget, this policy permits 
the government to report a smaller deficit. If the head tax is 
sufficiently large, the government could potentially eliminate 
not only this year's official deficit, but indeed the entire stock 
of outstanding government debt. If it made the head "tax" 
sufficiently large, the government could report a very substan 
tial surplus. Those of you who are following closely the details 
of this head "tax" "tax" credit policy will see that it 
effectively amounts to relabeling as "taxes" the receipts the 
government obtains from selling bonds, and relabeling as 
"tax" credits the payments made by the government of 
interest plus principal on its sale of bonds.
To summarize, I've pointed out that with a little change in 
labeling of Social Security receipts and payments, the govern 
ment's reported debt would be roughly five times its current 
value; alternatively, with a little relabeling of the money it 
receives and pays out in its bond transactions, the government 
could wipe out any reported debt and report instead enor 
mous surpluses. But my point is not that we can color red 
what is really black or color black what is really red. My point 
is that in most economic models, particularly the standard 
neoclassical model, there is really no fundamental distinction 
between what is currently painted red and what is currently 
painted black, i.e., in most models there are no real reds and 
blacks when it comes to labeling government receipts and 
payments.
If I have you scratching your heads, I'm happy. I'm 
delighted if you believe, as do I, that money which the 
government calls taxes could just as well be called borrowing
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and vice versa. But if I've gotten you to agree with me that our 
official debt numbers are inherently arbitrary, then you should 
also agree that these numbers provide little guide to the 
fundamental stance of fiscal policy. If we can't rely on these 
numbers, how do we go about assessing the extent of redis 
tribution from younger to older generations, which is what 
most economists and perhaps most noneconomists associate 
with the concern about government debt?
The answer is that we need to examine directly the lifetime 
budget constraints of different generations and ask whether 
government policies have expanded the lifetime consumption 
opportunities of older generations at the price of reduced 
lifetime consumption opportunities of younger and future 
generations. The answer to this question is invariant to how 
we label particular receipts and payments between the private 
economy and the government. Accounting doesn't matter 
when looking at a generation's budget constraint because the 
bottom line is how much can the generation afford to 
consume; this depends on the generations' lifetime receipts 
from the government net of payments to the government, not 
on how particular receipts and payments are labeled.
Once one becomes attuned to thinking about economic 
debt policy in terms of intergenerational redistribution, it 
becomes clear that a variety of government policies, many of 
which have no direct effect on reported government deficits, 
transfer resources from later to earlier generations. Before 
describing these mechanisms, it's worth mentioning why one 
should care about intergenerational redistribution towards 
older generations. The answer is that, as a result of such a 
transfer, older generations are likely to increase their con 
sumption by more than younger generations lower their 
consumption. The reason is that older generations have fewer 
years left to live and consequently have fewer years over which
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to consume the additional resources. Younger generations, on 
the other hand, spread their reduction in lifetime resources 
over more years; hence, their response to the transfer is to 
lower their consumption this year somewhat, knowing they 
will also lower their consumption for many years in the future. 
In the jargon of economists, older generations are likely to 
have larger marginal propensities to consume than younger 
generations. If this is true, then intergenerational redistribu 
tion will eventuate in an increase in total national consump 
tion and, according to neoclassical models, a decline in total 
national saving. The decline in saving may also spell a decline 
in investment and higher real interest rates as capital becomes 
a relatively scarce factor of production.
Economists and others in the U.S. are properly concerned 
abut this crowding-out process. Since 1980 we have been 
saving only 4.7 percent of our net national product. In 
contrast, we saved 7.8 percent of NNP in the 1970s, 8.7 
percent in the 1960s, and 8.8 percent in the 1950s. While the 
current saving rate of 5.2 percent is above that of the early 
1980s, it is still 41 percent lower than the saving rate of the 
1950s.
In addition to redistributing to older generations by cutting 
"taxes" now and raising "taxes" in the future, i.e., reducing 
payments from the private sector to the government now and 
increasing such payments in the future, the government 
employs several other mechanisms of intergenerational redis 
tribution, some of which are quite subtle. One somewhat 
subtle mechanism is running an unfunded, "pay as you go" 
Social Security system.
In this Ponzi scheme, younger working generations pay 
money to Social Security which hands the money over to 
older, retired generations in the form of retirement benefits. In 
this scheme, every generation pays for the retirement benefits
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of the previous generation with one exception; at the initiation 
of the program the first generation receives benefits without 
having to finance the retirement of its immediate predecessors. 
This generation receives a windfall at the expense of younger 
and future generations whose lifetime budgets would be 
greater were they not enrolled in Social Security.
While many of the big winners from Social Security are 
already deceased, there is still significant intergenerational 
redistribution from Social Security. Middle income house 
holds who were born in 1930 are predicted roughly to break 
even from the system. In contrast, middle income households 
in the cohort born in 1990 are projected over their lifetimes to 
lose, on net, roughly $60,000 in present value as a consequence 
of participating in Social Security.
Another subtle intergenerational transfer mechanism is 
changes in the tax base that shift the burden of "taxation" 
(payments to the government) from older to younger genera 
tions. An example here is switching from an income tax that 
taxes the capital income of the elderly as well as the labor 
earnings of the young and middle-aged to a wage tax that hits 
only the young and middle-aged. A variant of this type of 
fundamental debt policy is increases in the progressivity of the 
income tax. Switching from a less to a more progressive 
income tax shifts more of the tax burden onto middle-aged 
and younger workers whose annual incomes are larger than 
those of retired elderly for whom income consists simply of 
the return on savings.
Perhaps the most subtle mechanism of intergenerational 
redistribution is government policies that lower the market 
value of financial assets. Since older generations are the 
primary owners of assets, a reduction in asset values reduces 
the consumption opportunities of the elderly; at the same 
time, it expands the consumption opportunities of younger
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generations who, through time, can purchase these assets from 
older generations at a lower price.
An example of such a policy is reducing investment incen 
tives, which, by the way, is part of the President's tax reform 
proposal. Since investment incentives in the U.S. are effec 
tively restricted to new investment, old capital, capital that has 
been fully or partially written off, sells at a discount reflecting 
the preferential tax treatment available to new capital. A 
reduction in investment incentives means a smaller discount 
on old capital, i.e., a capital gain to owners of old capital. This 
capital gain accrues to older generations, and young and 
middle-aged generations are worse off because they must pay 
a higher price to acquire claims to the economy's capital 
stock.
Having pointed out these various mechanisms for running 
true economic debt policies and having argued strongly that 
one cannot gauge these policies by looking at official debt 
numbers, it's time to look at the reality of recent economic 
debt policy. The Reagan personal income tax cuts have 
certainly enhanced the lifetime budgets of older generations at 
the expense of younger generations, but, up to the present, the 
magnitude of this intergenerational redistribution appears 
small when set against the massive intergenerational redistri 
bution in the 1960s and 1970s associated with Social Security.
A second feature of Reagan's fiscal policy is the sizable 
investment incentives passed in 1981. As argued above, this 
policy generates capital losses to owners of existing (old) 
capital and constitutes an economic surplus policy. My sense 
of the magnitude of this redistribution when set against the 
redistribution from the tax cuts is that it corresponds, very 
roughly, to having postponed the tax cuts by one year.
The third significant fiscal policy altering the intergenera 
tional resource distribution is the 1983 Social Security reform.
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From the perspective of at least 1977, Social Security's 
long-run finances seemed fairly secure. But the ensuing reces 
sions and other economic and demographic events changed 
the long- as well as short-run picture. The 1983 reforms made 
very substantial cuts in the future benefits of all current young 
generations. The new Social Security law gradually raises the 
retirement age to 67 and envisions, through the process of 
bracket creep, the eventual income taxation of Social Security 
benefits of all retirees, not simply high income retirees as is 
now the case.
For current young generations, these legislated long-term 
cuts in Social Security benefits are very sizable when com 
pared, for example, with the tax savings they have enjoyed to 
date from the Reagan tax cut. Hence this policy also repre 
sents a significant economic surplus policy since it is reducing 
the welfare of current young generations while improving the 
projected welfare of future generations.
My assessment is that the Reagan fiscal policy has, to date, 
generated, on net, a small economic surplus, although this 
assessment could change signs if tax rates are not raised in the 
near future. However, whether one views the policy in toto as 
transferring to older or to younger generations, it is clear that 
the national hysteria concerning deficits has been predicated 
on a set of numbers that have little or no relationship to the 
issue of fundamental concern. Asserting that the deficit num 
bers have no clothes is not the same as asserting that all is fine 
in our economic house. On the contrary, it appears clear that 
the country is experiencing a secular decline in saving which 
may well be the result of the unreported enormous economic 
deficits associated with Social Security in the last three 
decades.
In closing, let me point out that a very real problem with the 
current fixation on the official budget deficit is that once that
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number is fixed, through either a real or an accounting policy, 
the public and the government will lose interest in the question 
of debt, and, indeed, may return to the kinds of hidden debt 
policies of the last 30 years. It is high time to remove the 
blinders. Fiscal illusion is a very real problem; it not only 
blinds us to current fiscal reality, it also leaves us very little 
guide to improving our economic future.
